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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 03-4766





REVEREND KATHY HIGGINS; MAJOR
HASSETT; FATHER GEORGE MONECK,
all at SCI-Greene at time of 
events; FATHER FRANCIS T. MENEI
                              
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 99-cv-00915)
District Judge: Honorable William L. Standish
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 28, 2004
Before: NYGAARD, AMBRO, and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed November 18, 2004)
                             
OPINION
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
William Brown appeals the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in
2favor of the Superintendent and other Department of Corrections (“DOC”) officials at the
State Correctional Institution at Greene, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Greene”).  Brown alleges in
this § 1983 claim that enforcing the DOC’s grooming policy against him violated his First
Amendment and equal protection rights under the United States Constitution and
constituted illegal retaliation.  As the District Court correctly granted summary judgment
on Brown’s First Amendment claim and he waived his equal protection and retaliation
claims, we affirm the District Court’s order.  
1. BACKGROUND
Brown was an inmate at SCI-Greene from 1994 through 2002.  He was also
recommitted to that facility from 2003 until 2004 and has now been released on parole. 
He asserts that he practices Rastafarianism and did so during his incarceration. 
The DOC’s grooming policy requires that, among other things, the length of an
inmate’s hair not fall below the top of his shirt collar.  During some of Brown’s time at
SCI-Greene, his hair length violated this policy.  Brown received several misconduct
reports and spent two years and seven months in a Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) for
failing to comply with direct orders to cut his hair.  Indeed, Brown was kept in RHU until
he so complied.  Because Rastafarianism prohibits its followers from cutting their hair,
Brown asserts he was entitled to a religious exemption to the DOC grooming policy. 
Exemptions from the grooming policy’s hair length requirements are granted for
legitimate religious reasons on a case-by-case basis.  In 1996 and September of 1997,
3Brown made requests for grooming exemptions because of his religious beliefs.  On each
occasion, Brown met with a Facility Chaplain who concluded Brown demonstrated little
knowledge of the beliefs and practices of Rastafarianism.  Additionally, Chaplaincy
Department records show that Brown had previously practiced the Muslim, Protestant,
and Native American religions, and also had attended numerous services with the
Moorish Science Temple of America.  Based on the Facility Chaplain’s recommendation,
the Superintendent thereafter denied Brown’s requests.
In December 1997, the DOC amended its grooming policy to require an inmate
seeking a religious exemption to submit a written document, apparently from an outside
source, indicating that he had a history of adhering to the tenets of the particular faith
group.  In 1998, Brown submitted a letter from an acknowledged Rastafarian leader
stating that Brown had written to join the leader’s church only one month earlier.  The
Superintendent again denied Brown’s request, finding that the letter did not show Brown
had a sufficiently long history of adhering to Rastafarianism.  
Brown filed a complaint with the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania alleging various constitutional violations.  Thereafter, the
defendants sought and obtained summary judgement.  Brown appeals, asserting that the
District Court did not adequately analyze his First Amendment claim and failed to
consider both his equal protection and retaliation claims.
42. ANALYSIS
a. Brown’s First Amendment Claim
Prison regulations need only be rationally related to legitimate penological
interests to survive constitutional challenge.  Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132
(2003) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).  In addition, our Court has held
that a prisoner challenging a prison regulation on the ground that it interferes with the
prisoner’s right to exercise religion freely must first establish that his alleged beliefs are
both sincerely held and religious in nature.  DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51-52 (3d Cir.
2000) (quoting Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (3d Cir. 1981)).   
In Turner, the United States Supreme Court provided four factors to determine
whether a prison regulation rationally relates to legitimate penological objectives.  482
U.S. at 89-91.  First, there must be a “valid, rational connection” between the regulation
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.  Id. at 89 (quoting Block
v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).  Second, where inmates have alternative means
of exercising the asserted right, courts should be “particularly conscious” of the deference
owed to corrections officials in establishing prison regulations.  Id. at 90.  Third, if
accommodation of the asserted right will have a significant effect on other inmates,
prison staff, or the allocation of prison resources, courts should be particularly deferential
to the informed decisions of corrections officials.  Id.  Last, an absence of ready
alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a regulation.  Id. 
5The District Court, by adopting the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation,
found against Brown on all four factors.  Brown has not challenged these findings in his
brief to us.  Rather, he asserts that our holding in DeHart required the District Court first
to determine whether Brown’s beliefs were both sincerely held and religious in nature
before conducting a Turner analysis.  
Brown is correct insofar as DeHart did conclude that the mere assertion of First
Amendment rights does not automatically bestow constitutional protections — “if a
prisoner’s request for [a religious accommodation] is not the result of sincerely held
religious beliefs, the First Amendment imposes no obligation on the prison to honor that
request.”  DeHart, 227 F.3d at 52.  Therefore, the DeHart requirements of both sincerity
and religious nature must be satisfied before a court need undertake a Turner analysis.  Id. 
In this case defendants explicitly assumed in their summary judgment motion that
Brown’s beliefs were sincerely held and religious in nature.  This effectively resolved any
DeHart issues in Brown’s favor.  Furthermore, as DeHart makes clear, it is up to the
prisons themselves to assert challenges to the sincerity or religious nature of a prisoner’s
beliefs, and where no such challenges are made, the religious nature and sincerity of the
beliefs are assumed.  227 F.3d at 52.  Here, as in DeHart, defendants made no such
challenge.  Brown claims that defendants did not stipulate that Brown’s beliefs were
sincerely held and religious in nature.  Even were this true, it would be irrelevant.  If,
instead of assuming the validity of Brown’s beliefs and undertaking the Turner analysis,
6the District Court had addressed whether Brown’s beliefs were sincerely held and
religious in nature and concluded that they were not, Brown would still lose.  The District
Court therefore did not err by considering the Turner factors without undertaking a
DeHart analysis.  Thus, we affirm summary judgment against Brown on his First
Amendment claim.
b. Brown’s Equal Protection and Retaliation Claims
Brown also appeals the District Court’s failure to consider his equal protection and
retaliation claims.  Though he made these claims in his initial complaint, neither the
Order of the District Court granting summary judgment, nor the Report and
Recommendation of the Magistrate that informed that Order, considered them. 
Defendants respond that, though Brown raised equal protection and retaliation in his
complaint and the District Court failed to address these matters, his failure to raise them
at the summary judgment stage was a waiver.  We agree. 
In its scheduling order of September 26, 2003, the Magistrate Judge ordered that
Brown file a response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment by October 16, 2003. 
In that order the Magistrate Judge warned that “failure to file a response to the motion
will be construed as consent to the granting of [it].”  Brown responded only by filing a
motion to extend time to file a response (and then but two days before the response was
due).  Though Brown’s request was denied, he still filed nothing.  This waives both
claims.  As the First Circuit stated in Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667 (1st
7Cir. 1995), “[e]ven an issue raised in the complaint but ignored at summary judgment
may be deemed waived.  ‘If a party fails to assert a legal reason why summary judgment
should not be granted, that ground is waived and cannot be considered or raised on
appeal.’”  Id. at 678 (quoting Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 877 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
Furthermore, “[i]t is a well-settled rule that a party opposing a summary judgment motion
must inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should
not be entered.  If it does not do so, and loses the motion, it cannot raise such reasons on
appeal.”  Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1983).  That is this
case.
 *   *   *   *   *
For these reasons, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.
